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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
REAL PROPERTY
It seems hard to imagine that the common-law anachronism, the
fee tail estate, can still rear its hoary head in a modern conveyance.
Such was the case in Guida v. Thompson,' in which a warranty deed
was to "A and B, and the heirs of their bodies," whereas the grant-
ing, habendum, and warranty clauses of the standard printed deed
form referred to "heirs and assigns," with the words "and assigns"
crossed out. A and B subsequently conveyed in fee simple. Prior to
said conveyance, the original grantor executed a quit claim deed to
A and B in fee simple, which stated that the earlier deed inadvertent-
ly added after the names of the grantees the following words, "and
the heirs of their bodies." The suit was for a declaratory judgment
to construe the various deeds and estates acquired.
The court construed the original deed as vesting in the grantees
thereof a fee tail estate. The grantor thereupon was divested of all
interest in the premises except a possibility of a reverter. The sec-
ond conveyance by the original grantor merely transferred his possi-
bility of a reverter and could not serve to disentail the estate origi-
nally conveyed. Furthermore, the expression of intention contained
in the second deed could not serve as parol evidence3 to aid in con-
struing the original deed because the court held that the language in
the original deed was unambiguous. Obviously, A and B, as the
original donees in tail, could not convey a fee simple,4 but at best a
defeasible fee simple.5
It might have been possible for the trial judge to declare the
original deed to be a fee simple absolute conveyance, 6 which was the
obvious intention of the original grantor; regardless, the involved
fact situation of the case presents an obvious caveat to the draftsman.
The original scrivener is unidentified, and one can only hope that the
entanglements which followed justify the current statute.7
1. 160 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
2. Statute de donis of Westminster 2, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 1.
3. Thomas v. Thomas, 108 Ohio App. 193, 161 N.E.2d 416 (1958), held that a docu-
ment written by the grantor subsequent to the execution of the deed and purporting to im-
press a trust upon the property conveyed, which was in contradiction to testimony, was not
the sufficient proof necessary to establish a trust on the property. See also discussion in
Trusts section, p. 443 infra.
4. Pollock v. Speidel, 17 Ohio St. 439 (1867), especially the third paragraph of the syllabus.
5. In this case defeasible only by the claim of the heirs of the body of the donee in rail on
the latter's death if there be such heirs, the reverter of the grantor having been conveyed. If
the later conveyance was intended to disentail the estate rather than to convey the grantor's
reverter, the grantor should have advised the grantee to proceed under the disentailing statute
of Ohio, OHio REV. CODE § 5303.21.
6. Collins v. Collins, 40 Ohio St. 353 (1883).
7. OHio REV. CODE § 317.111 (Supp. 1959).
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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
The Ohio Supreme Court decision in Bove v. Giebel" is of value
in pointing up the current court philosophy in construing deed restric-
tions. The various sublots of a subdivision were restricted to use
"for residence purposes only." The defendants purchased a six-acre
tract adjoining, but outside of, the division, and purchased a twenty-
five foot strip of a sublot within the subdivision to be used as a drive-
way to and from the six-acre tract. Both the common pleas court
and the court of appeals enjoined defendants from so using the
twenty-five foot strip. The judgment of the court of appeals was
reversed. Judge Taft, applying the well recognized rule that deed
restrictions are to be construed strictly against the restriction,' held
that "for residence purposes only" does not necessarily mean for resi-
dence purposes in the subdivision only.
CONDEMNATION CASES
Each annual Survey of Ohio real property law of necessity re-
quires consideration of condemnation cases. Without question the
current highway development programs, inevitably followed by util-
ity expansion programs, make an understanding of condemnation
principles and procedures a must for the modern practitioner. Al-
though there is nothing new in the case of Ohio Edison Company v.
Gantz,10 it is a commendable decision on the fundamentals of the
law governing this class of cases.
The action was by the utility to appropriate an easement for an
electric transmission line. The appeal considered the usual grounds
of error: failure to name necessary parties ;"1 failure to prove dis-
agreement as to compensation ;12 and failure to prove necessity. 3
With regard to the element of "necessity," the opinion notes that
what the condemning plaintiff is required to prove is a reasonable
necessity, rather than an absolute necessity. Furthermore, where two
routes are possible, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, the ap-
propriating agency is at liberty to select the route it will follow.
Most condemnation cases are concerned with valuation, rather
than an attempt to restrain or defeat the condemnation proceeding.
It is, therefore, interesting to note that evidence as to the most valu-
able use 4 of the land involved is not to be refused merely because such
8. 169 Ohio St. 325, 159 N.E.2d 425 (1959).
9. Loblaw, Inc. v. Warren Plaza, 163 Ohio St. 581, 127 N.E.2d 754 (1955); Ritzenthaler
v. Pepas, 107 Ohio App. 385, 159 NE.2d 472 (1958).
10. 159 NE.2d 477 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
11. OHio REv. CODE 2709.06.
12. OHIo REv. CODE § 2709.03.
13. Giesy v. Cincinnati, W & Z Ry., 4 Ohio St. 308 (1854).
14. Sowers v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 NXE.2d 313 (1951), especially the third
paragraph of the syllabus. On valuation, it has been held that the resolution of the Director
of Highways filed in accordance with OHIO REv. CODE § 5519.01 is admissible in evidence
as an admission against the Director. See In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Pur-
poses, 107 Ohio App. 58, 156 NE.2d 334 (1958).
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